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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-The Establishment
Clause-The Reasonable Accommodation Rule
Mandates Unconstitutional Preferences for
Religious Workers in Title VII Actions
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff,' discharged from his employment for failure to com-
ply with the union security provisions2 of a collective bargaining
agreement signed by his employer and union,3 brought suit to enjoin
enforcement of the provisions and to obtain reinstatement to his
former position. Plaintiff contended that because his religious be-
liefs forbade support of any labor union,4 his employer's failure to
accommodate these beliefs constituted religious discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the free
exercise clause.6 Defendants maintained that they were not required
1. Plaintiff Kenneth Yott began his employment with North American Rockwell in 1947
and held the position of office equipment mechanic at the time of his dismissal.
2. The "union security" provision required either membership in the union or the
payment of dues to the union by those who did not want to obtain active membership. Yott
v. North American Rockwell, 428 F. Supp. 763, 764 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The Supreme Court
has approved the use of union security clauses as a proper exercise of congressional power
under the commerce clause. Union security clauses are viewed as a means of assuring stable
labor relations on the job site. "Free riders" are discouraged under the compulsory provisions
so that all who receive the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement pay their fair share.
See Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See generally MoRRIs, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 697-725 (1970).
3. On October 6, 1968, defendants North American Rockwell Corporation and Local
887, UAW, amended their collective bargaining agreement to require all employees to pay
union dues. Plaintiff, after refusing to abide by the union security provision, was discharged
on January 14, 1969. Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 399 (9th Cir.
1974).
4. At trial defendants conceded that Yott sincerely held religious beliefs prohibiting his
compliance with the union security agreement. 428 F. Supp. at 765. The IRS had denied his
church tax exempt status, but in Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1962), the
court held that church members were entitled to deduct contributions.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp.
IV 1974)). In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . ..
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
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to accommodate Plaintiff's religious precepts under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 7 The. United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the reasonable accommodation rule as incorporated into the
1972 Randolph Amendment to Title V1 5 required an accommoda-
tion unless either defendant employer or defendant union would
suffer an undue hardship.' On remand, Defendants argued that the
7. The gist of Defendants' argument was that the pertinent guidelines issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which Plaintiff contended required
his employer to accommodate his religious beliefs to his employment, was an ultra vires
exercise of the Commission's statutory authority and inconsistent with the thrust of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. The guidelines in question provided:
Part 1605-Guidelines On Discrimination Because Of Religion.
§ 1605.1 Observance of the Sabbath and other religious holidays
(a) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it is
discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regu-
larly observe Friday evening and Saturday or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath
or who observe certain special religious holidays during the year and as a consequence,
do not work on such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds
required by section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on
the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of
employees and prospective employees where such an accomodation can be made without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for
example, may exist where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another
employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the
Sabbath Observer.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an
employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the burden
of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodation to the religious
needs of the employee unreasonable.
(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an
equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to
the varied practices of the American people.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1974).
8. See notes 52-53 infra and accompanying text.
9. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision and remanded the case to
resolve the question whether North American Rockwell and the union could make a reasona-
ble accommodation to Yott's religious beliefs without undue hardship. The court suggested
that the district court apply a "business necessity" test to determine whether an accommoda-
tion was required. 501 F.2d 398, 402 n.6 (1974); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) (discussion of the "business necessity" test). Additionally, relying principally on
Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971), the
Ninth Circuit panel adopted a balancing test in dismissing Yott's free exercise claim. Follow-
ing language in Linscott, the Court found that Yott's alternative was "not destitution but
merely employment in a non-union shop." The Court found ample authority for the proposi-
tion that union security clauses are constitutional when "minor infringements on First
Amendment rights are concerned." 501 F.2d at 403-04 (1974). See International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1957); Gray v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally Clark,
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provision of the Randolph Amendment requiring an employer "to
reasonably accommodate" an employee's religious beliefs violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment.' 0 The District
Court for the Central District of California, held, judgment for the
Defendants. By attempting to promote the free exercise of religion
through the requirement that an employer reasonably accommodate
the religious beliefs and practices of his employees, the Randolph
Amendment fosters a governmental advancement of religion in vio-
lation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. Yott v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The inherent conflict" between the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause has never been examined thoroughly by the
Supreme Court.'" Each clause has been interpreted separately,'" giv-
ing rise to independent but paradoxical constitutional doctrines.
Both provisions, however, have been conceived by the Court as con-
structing a strict "wall of separation"' 4 between religion and govern-
ment. In Everson v. Board of Education,'5 one of the first cases to
Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HA~v. L. REv. 327 (1969); Gianella, Religious
Liberty, Non-establishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. Government can neither pass laws that provide benefits to religion nor pass laws
that provide penalties to religion. Accordingly, an absolute prohibition of any benefits to
religion would tend to penalize religion while an absolute prohibition of any penalties to
religion would tend to benefit religion. Various theories have been advanced to reconcile this
conflict. One theory views the two clauses as guaranteeing an individual's freedom to choose
a particular religious belief and to practice the belief unfettered by governmental action. See
D. MANZULLO, NEITHER SACRED NOR PROFANE 5 (1973). Another theory views the clauses as
creating a unifying principle of neutrality to religion, rendering the Constitution "religion-
blind." See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 1
(1961). But see Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389 (1963), in which Leo Pfeffer
illustrates the broad effect of Kurland's "religion-blind" thesis.
12. But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 413-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 317 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free
Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115 (1973); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion and Establishment
Clause Values, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968).
13. Although there is overlap and conflict between the two clauses, the Court tradition-
ally has analyzed religion cases based on either the establishment clause or free exercise
clause. See Kurland, supra note 11. But see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1970),
in which the Court recognized that both an "establishment clause" claim and a "free exer-
cise" claim had independent validity.
14. The "wall of separation" metaphor came from the writings of Jefferson, who viewed
the religion clauses of the first amendment to have built a wall of separation between church
and state. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
15. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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discuss the Supreme Court's view of the establishment clause,'6 the
Court construed the clause to preclude any interaction between gov-
ernment and religion and to invalidate any laws that "aid one reli-
gion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another."" Although
the Everson Court enunciated an absolute prohibition of govern-
ment aid to religion, it nevertheless upheld a New Jersey statute
providing a bus subsidy to all school children, including those at-
tending parochial schools, concluding that the application of the
legislation merely provided a general program for the transportation
of pupils to and from accredited schools.' 8 By approving such a
scheme, the Court demonstrated that indirect benefits could accrue
to religious organizations in the course of ordinary government func-
tions, such as providing school transportation, so long as the govern-
ment remained even-handed in its dealings with those organiza-
tions.'9 Thus the Everson Court appears to have relied on the princi-
16. Everson became the touchstone of future establishment clause cases. Prior cases
raising establishment clause issues did not engender any substantive comment by the Court.
See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (rejecting an establish-
ment clause argument because "this is a religious nation"); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S.
291 (1899) (Congressional grant to a religiously-affiliated hospital did not violate the estab-
lishment clause because the hospital was a "secular corporation"); Quick Bear v. Lepp, 210
U.S. 50 (1908) ("private transaction" outside the scope of the establishment clause); Arver
v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) ("unsoundness" of an establishment clause argument
precluded further evaluation); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930) (decided before establishment clause incorporated into fourteenth amendment); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (establishment clause incorporated into fourteenth
amendment but case decided on free exercise grounds). See generally Kurland, supra note
11 (survey of these early cases).
17. 330 U.S. at 15. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, viewed the establishment
clause as a reaction to the centuries of religious strife and persecution in England fostered
by "established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious suprem-
acy." Id. at 9-11. But see MURRAY, WE HoLD THESE TRUTHS 58 (1960), advocating that "Every
historian who has catalogued the historical factors which made for religious liberty and
separation of Church and State in America would doubtlessly agree that these institutions
came into being under the pressure of their necessity for the public peace." Murray isolates
four factors creating this necessity: (1) religious agnosticism in revolutionary America; (2)
diversity of denominations among the believers; (3) economics-"persecution and discrimina-
tion were as bad for business affairs as they were for the affairs of the soul;" and (4) increasing
religious freedom in England. Id. at 58-59. Kurland also has stated in this regard, "Like most
commands of our Constitution, the religion clauses of the first amendment are not statements
of absolute principles. History, not logic, explains their inclusion in the Bill of Rights; necess-
ity, not merely morality, justifies their presence there." Kurland, supra note 11, at 2. But
see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 33-43 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
for Jefferson and Madison religious freedom was the crux of the struggle for freedom in
general).
18. See 330 U.S. at 17.
19. See id. at 17-18. Justice Jackson's dissent, however, viewed the majority's reasoning
as being "utterly discordant" with its conclusion, "unconsciously giving the clock's hand a
1062
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ple that the first amendment merely requires the state to be neutral
in its relations with groups of religious believers, but it does not
require the state to be their adversary.
The Court's adoption of the principle that some laws benefiting
religion would not necessarily promote religion led the Court to
search for a test to determine when the establishment clause prohi-
bition would be triggered. In a series of cases dealing with religious
programs in public schools, 0 Sunday closing laws,21 and government
financial aid to parochial schools, 2 the Court formulated a three-
part test for measuring impingements upon the establishment
clause guarantee. 21 In Abington School District v. Schempp l4 the
Court articulated the first two prongs of the tripartite test and
struck down a Pennsylvania statute requiring Bible reading at the
opening of each school day. The Court gleaned from its prior formu-
lations on the establishment clause the constitutional requirement
that legislation have a "secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
The Court rarely has invalidated legislation by employing the
requirement that a particular government action have a secular
legislative purpose. The primary case in which the Court found an
backward turn." Id. at 19 & 28. Justice Rutledge, with whom Justices Frankfurter, Jackson,
and Burton agreed, concluded that history mandated the interpretation that the "[First]
Amendment forbids any appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support
any and all religious exercises." Id. at 41.
20. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
21. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
22. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973);
Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public
Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See generally Freund,
Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1680 (1969); Piekarski, Nyquist and Public
Aid to Private Schools, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 247 (1975); Note, Private Colleges, State Aid, and
the Establishment Clause, 1975 DuKE L.J. 976.
23. Prior to its development of the three-part establishment clause test, the Court
sought to ensure government neutrality by focusing on the degree of permissible interaction
between church and state. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, in which the Court stated that "The
constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The problem, like many
problems in constitutional law, is one of degree." 343 U.S. 306, 314. See also id. at 325
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
24. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
25. Id. at 222. The Schempp Court also indicated that unlike the standard for free
exercise violations, there need be no showing of coercion to violate the establishment clause.
Id. at 223.
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impermissible sectarian purpose was Epperson v. Arkansas,2" which
struck down a statute prohibiting school teachers from teaching the
theory of evolution. Noting that fundamentalist sectarian convic-
tion was the sole force behind the law's enactment, the Court attrib-
uted to the law the purpose of proscribing a body of knowledge
because it conflicted with established religious doctrines.7 Typi-
cally, however, the Court has rejected challenges to state statutes
that come before it for review by finding a nonsectarian purpose
behind the legislation. In McGowan v. Maryland,2 8 for example, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Sunday closing law, reason-
ing that although such laws originally were motivated by religious
ideals, they recently had assumed a secular function. Thus the
Court has recognized certain secular purposes behind a law that
otherwise appears to have religious motivations.
In contrast to the purpose prong of the Supreme Court's test for
scrutinizing alleged establishment clause violations, the primary
effect prong of the test frequently has been employed to strike down
state legislation designed to provide financial aid to parochial
schools and to inject religious observance and teaching into public
schools. As in Everson, the Court's analysis of the primary effect of
a law usually focuses upon whether the government has maintained
the requisite degree of neutrality toward religion. In cases concern-
ing state aid to parochial schools, neutrality most often is found
when the secular and religious functions of an institution can be
distinguished sufficiently.
In Board of Education v. Allen2 19 the Court approved a plan for
lending textbooks to private school children because the books were
sufficiently related to the school's secular functions, thus ensuring
that the loans would not advance an establishment of religion. The
Court, however, has invalidated plans for tuition reimbursements
for private school children and salary supplements for private school
teachers because of a lack of neutrality. In Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist,3" for example, a tuition reimbursement pro-
26. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
27. Id. at 107.
28. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
29. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Allen Court applied the Schempp rule to a statute that
provided textbook loans without charge to both public and private schools. The Court drew
parallels with the Everson bus subsidy, emphasized that the loan benefited all students, and
acknowledged the valuable role private education has played in American life.
30. 413 U.S. 756 (1973); accord, Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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gram failed the effect criterion because such financial aid, unlike
busing, textbooks, and fire and police protection, was not a benefit
bestowed "in common to all citizens." 31 Despite the program's secu-
lar purpose of providing a quality education for a greater number
of its citizens, the Court prohibited the state from endorsing such a
program because it effected an advancement of religion by operating
as a reward for parents who sent their children to sectarian schools.3 2
The Nyquist Court also invalidated direct grants to private schools
for the maintenance and repair of facilities on the ground that the
plan placed no restrictions on how the grants were to be applied and
therefore did not distinguish sufficiently between religious and secu-
lar facilities.3 3 In concentrating on the effect prong of the three-part
test, the Court indicated that it had refined the "primary effect"
criterion to invalidate laws having the "direct and immediate" ef-
fect of advancing religion.34 Whether defined in terms of "primary"
or "direct and immediate," the effect prong of the tripartite test
mandates government neutrality, and the Court has adopted the
position that neutrality does not mean only that government must
not prefer one religion over another, but that it must stand apart
from religion in general.
The Court's policy of benevolent neutrality toward religious
exercise led it to consider an additional establishment clause crite-
rion. Recognizing its own prior inconsistencies in establishment
clause cases, the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission35 indicated that
the policy of benevolent neutrality requires an accommodation of
the conflicting religion clauses of the first amendment. To achieve
this accommodation, the Court added a third prong to its evolving
tripartite test, evaluating both the administrative entanglements to
which the supervision of a program dealing with religious organiza-
tions can give rise and the political divisiveness that often accompa-
nies a program involving aid to, and thus regulation of, religious
institutions. The question of excessive entanglement is directly re-
lated to the primary effect criterion36 as demonstrated by Walz.
Although the effect of granting tax exemptions to church property
31. 413 U.S. at 781-82.
32. See id. at 791.
33. Id. at 782.
34. Id. at 783-85 n.39; see note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Ad-
ministrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1181-82 (1974).
35. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
36. For a discussion of the interplay between the effect and entanglement analyses, see
Note, supra note 34.
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was beneficial to religion, the Court recognized that the alternative
of denying such exemptions would produce an excessive and con-
tinuing surveillance of religion leading to an impermissible degree
of entanglement.3 1
The entanglement criterion was developed further in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,3' in which the Court struck down legislation providing
salary supplements to parochial school teachers on the ground that
the strict government scrutiny required by the law to ensure a secu-
lar primary effect could engender entanglements of a continuing
and excessive nature. The Court once again focused on the concept
of neutrality toward religion, recognizing that programs providing
aid to religious institutions held a potential for political and social
divisiveness that would accompany each yearly appropriation.3 '
Because one of the purposes of the establishment clause is to remove
religious controversy from political and governmental settings, a law
calling for government scrutiny of religious organizations ap-
proaches the realm of unconstitutional establishment of religion.
Although the Supreme Court presently adheres to the three-
pronged test enunciated in Nyquist and the lower federal courts
consider it to be the proper test to apply in establishment clause
cases,4" it is questionable whether the criteria can be mechanically
applied to all legislation and still provide a broad scrutiny of all
potential promotions of religion." Since most legislation will pur-
port to have a clearly secular purpose in order to circumvent the
purpose prong of the test, judicial scrutiny under this criterion will
be limited. Similarly, use of the entanglement prong is limited be-
cause of the difficulty in determining when government contact
with religion becomes an entanglement. Moreover, the Court has
never explained satisfactorily its recasting in Nyquist of primary
effect as "direct and immediate."
The application of the tripartite test is complicated further by
claims arising under the free exercise clause. Government initiatives
to promote the free exercise of religion often have been attacked as
unconstitutional establishments of religion, and the tension be-
tween the two clauses suggests that there cannot be absolute separa-
37. 397 U.S. at 674.
38. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
39. Id. at 623.
40. See, e.g., Kleid v. Board of Educ., 406 F. Supp. 902, 904 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 43 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 97 S.
Ct. 2264 (1977).
41. See Note, supra note 34. See also 62 VA. L. Rav. 237, 251-52 (1976).
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tion between church and state. In upholding New York's tax exemp-
tion for property used solely for religious purposes, the Court in
Walz indicated that the policy of benevolent neutrality required
some interplay between government and religion.42 Also relying
upon a justification of neutrality, the Court in Sherbert v. Verner"
reversed a state's denial of unemployment benefits to a discharged
employee who refused to work on Saturdays because of her religious
beliefs. Although the Court recognized the attendant establishment
clause problems in its decision, the majority explained that it was
not fostering Sabbatarian religions but merely upholding the gov-
ernmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differ-
ences.44 The concurring and dissenting opinions, however, indicated
that the majority's decision compelled the state to promote certain
religious beliefs and thus to impinge upon the establishment clause
guarantee.45
One area in which the Court has been forced to confront the
conflict between the two clauses is the draft exemption given consci-
entious objectors. The exemption is not constitutionally compelled,
and its constitutional validity has been challenged on the grounds
that it has the effect of benefiting those religions whose tenets coin-
cide with the exemption. In Gillette v. United States,46 however, the
Court rejected this challenge and upheld the constitutionality of the
draft exemption. Although the Court conceded that the law had the
effect of providing a draft exemption only to those who opposed war
in any form by reason of religious training, it held that the exemp-
tion reflected a secular legislative purpose to provide for a workable
draft law that accommodated individual free exercise.4" In reaching
this holding, the Court appeared equally persuaded by the overrid-
ing government interest in an effective conscription statute.48
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has required the
lower federal courts to confront the conflict between the religion
clauses that faced the Supreme Court in the draft exemption cases.
42. 397 U.S. at 674-77.
43, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
44. Id. at 409.
45. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas wrote, "For the Free Exercise Clause is
written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what
the individual can exact from the government." Id. at 412. Justice Harlan, in dissent, wrote,
"I cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the State is constitutionally compelled to carve
out an exception to its general rule of eligibility. in the present case." Id. at 423.
46. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
47. Id. at 455-57.
48. Id. at 462.
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Title VII of the Act makes unlawful employment practices grounded
upon consideration of religion and requires remedial action to halt
such discrimination in the commercial employment sector. 9 The
EEOC, created by the Act to enforce compliance with the statute
and to promulgate administrative guidelines, has issued guidelines
requiring an employer "to reasonably accommodate" the religious
beliefs of his employees in scheduling workshifts5 0 Congress incor-
porated the reasonable accommodation guidelines promulgated by
the EEOC into Title VII by enacting the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972.51 The Act included the Randolph Amendment','
and added section 2000e(j) to Title VII, which defined religion as
including all aspects of religious observance and practice and re-
quired that an employer demonstrate that he could not accommo-
date an employee's religious practices without undue hardship."3
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended by The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1974). Congress enacted
Title VII as an exercise of its commerce clause power. 110 CONG. REc. 1528 (1964) (remarks
of Rep. Celler). See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The
primary motivation for Title VII appears to have been to outlaw racially discriminatory
employment practices-"the glaring . . . discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our nation." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963). See generalty
Symposium-1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REv. 413 (1964).
50. See Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment-A
Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327 (1975). The EEOC issued initial guidelines in 1966 but
the 1967 guidelines were the first to place an affirmative duty on the employer to accommo-
date the religious needs of his employees. Compare 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966) with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.1 (1967).
51. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. IV
1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)). See Note, supra note 50.
52. The amendment is named after its sponsor, Senator Randolph of West Virginia,
who said:
I say to the distinguished chairman of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee,
who manages this bill, that there has been a partial refusal at times on the part of
employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to abstain from work in the
nature of hire on particular days. So there has been, because of understandable pres-
sures, such as commitments of a family nature and otherwise, a dwindling of the mem-
bership of some of the religious organizations because of the situation to which I have
just directed attention.
My own pastor in this area, Rev. Delmer Van Home, has expressed his concern and
distress that there are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially with
the younger people, and understandably so, with reference to a possible inability of
employers on some occasions to adjust work schedules to fit the requirements of the faith
of some of their workers.
118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. IV 1974) provides: "The term 'religion' includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demon-
strated that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective em-
1068
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Challengers of the Randolph Amendment have attacked sec-
tion 2000e(j) as effecting an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion." The first of the challenges to reach a federal appeals court
on this issue was Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,5" in which the Sixth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule under the Nyquist three-pronged test. Relying on Gillette,
the court reasoned that the rule was designed to put teeth in the
anti-discrimination laws and stated that it was constitutional for
Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise values through
affirmative action." Applying the effect prong of the test, the
Cummins court found that the rule neither advanced nor inhibited
religion but merely served to inhibit religious discrimination and to
guarantee reasonable job security. 57 The court did not view as signif-
icant any incidental benefits flowing to particular religious organi-
zations since the primary effect of the rule was not to advance
religion. Finally, the court found that the rule did not foster exces-
sive government entanglement with religion, noting that its enforce-
ment would require little contact between government and reli-
gion.59
In a strong dissent, Judge Celebrezze concluded that the rea-
sonable accommodation rule had both a nonsecular purpose and a
primary effect of advancing religion. The dissent found that the
purpose of the rule was to benefit certain religions and that the
rule's effect was neither even-handed in its operation nor neutral in
its primary impact. 0 The dissent argued that elimination of the rule
would lead to a proper "hands-off' policy consistent with the first
amendment." Moreover, the dissent noted that an employee wrong-
fully discharged by his employer because of his religion still would
have a remedy under Title VII.12 Although the elimination of the
ployee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business."
54. See, e.g., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172
(W.D.N.D. 1975).
55. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
56. 516 F.2d at 552.
57. Id. at 553.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 556-59 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 560.
62. Id. at 559-60.
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rule might require sacrifices by those who stood to benefit by an
accommodation, in the dissent's view, the rule could not survive the
constitutional challenge. 3
The Cummins panel struggled with the inherent conflict pre-
sented by the absolute language of the two religion clauses. If Con-
gress passes legislation promoting the free exercise of religion, those
laws will be subject to challenges based on the establishment clause.
Although the Walz Court noted that no perfect or absolute separa-
tion is possible between the conflicting clauses, the question re-
mains whether Congress can affirmatively seek to promote freedom
of religion while respecting the principle of neutrality toward reli-
gion embedded in the first amendment. 4
II. THE INSTANT OPINION
Reaching the establishment clause issue after remand from the
Ninth Circuit, the instant court found section 2000e(j) to be an
unconstitutional enactment in view of the first amendment's abso-
lute prohibition of any law respecting an establishment of religion.
The affirmative accommodation mandate of section 2000e(j), ac-
cording to the court, did not comport with the principle of govern-
ment neutrality toward religion underlying the first amendment."
By adopting such a stance, the court reached what it termed a
simplistic resolution: the reasonable accommodation rule abridges
the establishment clause prohibition that Congress enact no law
respecting an establishment of religion by compelling an employer
63. Id. at 560. In conclusion, the dissent reasoned,
Our heritage has not withered because of the constitutional requirement that Govern-
ment keep 'hands off' religion. The heavy hand of Government may not be raised against
or in favor of religion. As Judge Learned Hand wrote,
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government,
though even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one the right to insist
that in the pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to
his own religious necessities. . .. We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies,
religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life; and
we can hope for no reward for the sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfac-
tion from within, or our expectations of a better world.
Id. (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
64. On June 16, 1977, the Supreme Court decided the case of Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977), holding that TWA was not required to accommodate the
religious beliefs of its employee, a Sabattarian, because it would involve more than a de
minimis hardship, which the Court equated with an "undue hardship." Thus, by adopting a
novel statutory interpretation, the Court avoided the more difficult constitutional issue.
Writing in dissent, Justice Marshall apparently would have decided the case on the grounds
he advanced in Gillette. Id. at 2277-83.
65. 428 F. Supp. at 765.
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to provide preferences to his workers solely on the basis of their
religious beliefs." Although the court did not discuss the require-
ments of the three-part test, it rejected the rationale advanced by
the Sixth Circuit in Cummins that the purpose of the reasonable
accommodation rule was "to put teeth in the existing prohibition
of religious discrimination""7 and not to promote a sectarian end.
The court characterized such analysis as clever sophistry since the
1964 Civil Rights Act already had provided adequate remedies for
religious discrimination in employment, 8 and agreed with the
Cummins dissent that the real purpose of the rule was to provide
preferential treatment to those whose religious precepts must be
accommodated to their employment." Additionally, the court found
that the Cummins court incorrectly relied on Gillette because in
that case a compelling government interest in assuring a workable
conscription law prevailed over any attendant promotions of reli-
gious interests. 0 The court also found the government interest in the
instant case less compelling than the interest involved in the Sun-
day closing law cases.71 Accordingly, the court held that the accom-
modation requirement, in the absence of any showing of discrimina-
tory intent or practice, lacked a legitimate secular purpose in viola-
tion of the establishment clause prohibition.72
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision is illustrative of a lower court's struggle to
reconcile the mandate of the establishment clause with Title VII's
religious accommodation requirement. The Everson Court devel-
oped the broad principle that government cannot pass laws "which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other."73 The Court arrived at this principle through a consideration
of the historical evils of government sponsorship of, financial sup-
port of, and active involvement with religion 7 that the clause was
designed to eradicate. As the instant court correctly found, such an
approach militates against the constitutionality of the reasonable
66. Id. at 766.
67. 516 F.2d at 552.
68. 428 F. Supp. at 766.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 767.
72. See id. at 766-67.
73. 330 U.S. at 15.
74. See id. at 8-15.
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accommodation rule. 5 Congress satisfied its duty to protect the free
exercise of religion by declaring religious discrimination unlawful
in the pre-amended version of Title VII. The Randolph Amend-
ment, however, actively promotes free exercise by favoring an iden-
tifiable class of beneficiaries whose accommodated religious pre-
cepts conflict with nondiscriminatory employment practices. Such
government accommodation clearly falls outside the scope of benign
neutrality, the major theme of establishment clause cases since
Everson.
The constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation rule
remains uncertain, however, until the Supreme Court provides a
satisfactory framework for analyzing establishment clause chal-
lenges to the amendment's affirmative action requirement. As ap-
plied in the instant case, the tripartite test fails to provide the broad
scrutiny of government contact with religion contemplated by the
Nyquist Court to filter out unconstitutional promotions of religion."6
The purpose prong of the test has been rendered illusory by legisla-
tion clothed with an express secular purpose and by the courts'
willingness, as Cummins illustrates, to accept the articulated non-
secular purposes of legislation before them for review." The entan-
glement criterion, which evolved primarily from a line of cases in-
volving financial aid to religious institutions, 8 may pose difficulties
when applied to the nonfinancial benefits accruing to religious prac-
tices as a result of the reasonable accommodation rule. 9 Conse-
quently, the only prong of the three-part test that accurately as-
sesses the encroachments upon the establishment clause guarantee
presented by impermissible nonfinancial benefits to religion, and
that cannot be circumvented by clever legislative drafting, is the
effect criterion. Applying the Nyquist refinement" of that test to the
75. See 428 F. Supp. at 766-67.
76. The Nyquist test has been described as "concentric circles forming a three-stage
filter, each trapping progressively smaller particles of religious effect." Note, A Workable
Definition of the Establishment Clause: Allen v. Morton Raises New Questions, 61 GEo. L.J.
1461, 1462 n.8 (1974).
77. See 516 F.2d at 552. The Cummins court found that the reasonable accommodation
rule was designed "to put teeth in the existing prohibition against religious discrimination."
Id.; see note 52 supra. But see Note, supra note 34, at 1180-81 (arguing that purpose scrutiny
has re-emerged as an incident of the effect test).
78. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
79. In Nyquist the Court indicated that most establishment clause cases involve the
relationship between religion and education. 413 U.S. at 772. It would appear, therefore, that
the Nyquist test is best suited for analyzing financial subsidies to religion. See also Note,
supra note 34, at 1186, in which the author concludes, "it is unlikely that the entanglement
test reviews anything more than the extent of supervisory administrative contacts."
80. See 413 U.S. at 783-85 n.39. But see Meek v. Pittinger, in which the Court appears
to adhere to the "primary" effect language. 421 U.S. at 358.
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reasonable accomodation rule demonstrates that the rule's direct
and immediate effect is to promote the religious interests of those
who demand accommodation of employment practices to their reli-
gious beliefs.
The instant court's holding that the reasonable accommodation
rule violates the first amendment perhaps can be attributed to its
analysis of Gillette,8 a pre-Nyquist case, in which the Supreme
Court upheld a federal statute that provided nonfinancial benefits
to certain religious interests. Although the Gillette Court focused on
the secular purpose of the conscientious objector exemption,82 it
implicitly recognized that a slight effect of promoting or inhibiting
religious interests, which arguably arose from the exemption pro-
vided by the conscription laws, must yield to a compelling govern-
ment interest, such as conscription for national defense purposes.8 3
Essentially, the Court adopted an analysis similar to that advanced
in the Sunday closing law cases, in which a state's interest in provid-
ing a uniform day of rest for its citizens outweighed the small degree
of religious promotion effected by the closing statutes. 4 Both
Gillette and the Sunday closing law cases thus suggest an alterna-
tive to the mechanical tripartite test, a balancing test similar to that
employed in free exercise challenges." In the area of affirmative
accommodation to religion, direct and immediate promotions of a
religious interest should be justified only if the government demon-
strates a compelling interest. Such an approach, coupled with a
consideration of competing free exercise values, would enable the
courts to reconcile the tension between the religion clauses and
would appraise more adequately the impact of government action
on the neutrality principle in light of increased societal demands for
affirmative government action.86
81. 428 F. Supp. at 766.
82. By employing a relatively narrow primary effect analysis, the Gillette Court focused
on the secular purpose of the conscientious objector exemption. The "direct and immediate"
effect of the exemption, however, would appear to promote certain religious beliefs. A better
aproach would be to recognize the promotional effects in favor of certain religions and weigh
these against compelling government interests.
83. The Gillette Court referred to the strong government interests in a workable con-
scription statute while discussing the free exercise claim. 401 U.S. at 461-62. If one accepts
the neutrality principle as reconciling the conflicting religion clauses, however, then it follows
that a strong government interest should prevail over an advancement, as well as an inhibi-
tion, of religion.
84. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-51 (1961).
85. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also note 9 supra.
86. Of course, direct financial benefits to religious interests should be a violation of the
establishment clause, but the value of the Nyquist standard within its particular setting is
its ability to distinguish financial benefits earmarked for religious interests from those that
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The principle that the government must not only refrain from
providing special preference to a particular religion, bul,, that it also
must stand apart from religion in general is abridged'once the gov-
ernment seeks to provide sustenance to religious interests. Govern-
ment neutrality is preserved, however, when the government merely
provides fertile ground on which religious interests can thrive inde-
pendently. Because state-imposed employment accommodation of
religious precepts creates proselytizing opportunities" upon which
religious interests flourish and because there is no overriding gov-
ernment interest in requiring such accommodation, Title Vil's Ran-
dolph Amendment transgresses establishment clause prohibitions.
JOHN P. KELLY
Torts-Occupational Safety and
Health-Employee's Common Law Right to a Safe
Workplace Compels Employer to Eliminate
Unsafe Conditions
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant utility company,' brought
suit to enjoin defendant from permitting cigarette smoking in plain-
tiff's work area. Plaintiff contended that the passive inhalation of
smoke and gaseous by-products of burning tobacco was deleterious
to her health2 and that defendant had breached its duty to provide
serve secular interests (e.g., religious training as opposed to arts and sciences).
Moreover, this approach requires first identifying what values are protected by the reli-
gion clauses. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680 (1969). The
balancing process would not be triggered until there was a direct and immediate promotion
or inhibition of a religious interest by state action that violates the neutrality principle.
87. It is apparent how the reasonable accommodation rule could aid the development
of a particular religious belief. Presumably, religious persecution encourages conversion be-
cause of nonsecular rewards; religious accommodation encourages conversion because of secu-
lar rewards as well. As a practical matter, it would be impossible to distinguish "true"
converts from those who are converting solely for the secular benefits. In any event, it is the
religious body as a whole that would benefit to the detriment of competing religions. See
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), in which the Court said, "The Government must
be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."
1. Plaintiff was a secretary for New Jersey Bell Telephone Company.
2. Medical evidence indicated that Plaintiff was allergic to tobacco smoke. Plaintiff's
symptoms, evoked by the presence of tobacco smoke, included severe throat irritation, nasal
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her a safe working environment by allowing other employees to
smoke in her work area.3 On submission of affidavits and briefs, the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, held, judgment
for plaintiff. An employee's common law right to a safe workplace
may be enforced by compelling the employer to eliminate all fore-
seeable and preventable hazards that are not necessary by-products
of the employer's business operation.Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel.
Co., 145 N.J.'Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legal recognition of an employee's right to a safe workplace 4
has evolved as a result of changing economic and social values.
Under common law principles an employee could recover damages
for injuries that resulted from his employer's failure to exercise ordi-
nary care' to provide a reasonably safe place to work.6 The em-
irritation which sometimes took the form of nosebleeds, irritation to the eyes which had
caused corneal abrasion and corneal erosion, headaches, nausea, and vomiting.
3. Plaintiff had sought to correct the problem through the use of grievance mechanisms
established by collective bargaining between defendant employer and Plaintiff's union. This
action resulted in the installation of an exhaust fan in the vicinity of Plaintiff's work area.
Because of complaints from other employees, however, the fan had not been in operation
continuously and the attempted solution was unsuccessful.
4. The term "workplace" as used throughout this Comment refers to the entirety of the
employee's working environment. The term embraces not only the physical attributes of the
place of employment itself but also the mechanical instrumentalities used in the course of
employment and the conduct of fellow employees. Although at one time legal distinctions
were based upon these component parts of the "workplace," the modern trend appears to
judge the employee's environment in its totality.
5. See, e.g., Hall v. Burton, 201 Cal. App. 2d 72, 19 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1962); Swiercz v.
Illinois Steel Co., 231 III. 456, 83 N.E. 168 (1907); McDonald v. Standard Oil Co., 69 N.J.L.
445, 55 A. 289 (1903); Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N.Y. 188, 23 N.E. 537 (1890). See also T. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 267 (student ed. 1907); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF ToRTS § 18.6 n.20 (1956); 1 C. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 14 (1904); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971).
Labatt describes the standard of care as that which the master would exercise for his
own safety if the place or instrumentality in question were furnished for his personal use. 1
LABATr, supra, § 14.
6. See, e.g., Thompson v. California Const. Co., 148 Cal. 35, 82 P. 367 (1905); Mueller
v. Elm Park Hotel Co., 398 Ill. 60, 75 N.E. 2d 314 (1947); Estelle v. Board of Educ., 26 N.J.
Super. 9, 97 A.2d 1 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953); McGuire v. Bell Tel. Co., 167 N.Y. 208, 60
N.E. 433, 127 N.Y.S. 315 (1901). See also, COOLEY, supra note 5, § 267; 2 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 5, § 18.6 n.20; 1 LABATr, supra note 5, §§ 6-7; PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80.
At common law an employer also was obligated to provide safe appliances, tools, and
equipment for the work; to give warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably
be expected to remain in ignorance; to provide a sufficient number of suitable fellow servants;
and to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees that would make the work
safe. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80. See also COOLEY, supra note 5, § 266.
Recovery under the common law was limited to those cases in which the employer
breached one of the specific duties outlined above. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80.
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ployee's right to recover was based on the employer's negligence,
which the courts determined by balancing the magnitude of the risk
and the likelihood of harm against the burden of avoiding the risk.7
Thus the common law did not require an employer to eliminate even
very serious hazards if to do so would place an unreasonable eco-
nomic burden upon his enterprise.8 Furthermore, an employer's
compliance with the established safety practices of his particular
industry was important, if not conclusive, evidence of lack of negli-
gence.9 Even if employer negligence could be established, the com-
mon law defenses of assumption of risk," contributory negligence,"
and the fellow servant rule' 2 often barred an employee's recovery. As
7. See Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 612, 616 (1974). See also 1 LABATT, supra note 5, §§ 14-16.
8. See Miller, supra note 7, at 616.
9. See, e.g., Caldwell-Watson Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Watson, 183 Ala. 326, 62 So. 859
(1913); Pauly v. King, 44 Cal. 2d 649, 284 P.2d 487 (1955); 1 LABATT, supra note 5, § 44; cf.
PROSSER, supra note 5, § 33 (stating that even an entire industry, by adopting careless
methods to save time, effort, or money was not permitted to set its own uncontrolled stan-
dard).
In Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America, 11 N.J. Super. 445, 78 A.2d 411 (Super. Ct.
App. Div.), cert. denied, 7 N.J. 77, 80 A.2d 494 (1951), cited in the instant decision, the New
Jersey court stated that an employer was not negligent if he furnished a place of employment
and appliances of a kind in general use and conducted his business in a manner conforming
to the established standards of those engaged in the specific business. Id. at 445, 78 A.2d at
412.
10. See, e.g., Donahue v. Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co., 169 Mass. 574, 48 N.E. 842
(1897); Soutar v. Minneapolis Int'l Elec. Co., 68 Minn. 18, 70 N.W. 796 (1897); Johnson v.
Devoe Snuff Co., 62 N.J.L. 417, 41 A. 936 (1898); Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N.Y. 372, 42 N.E. 986
(1896); Davis v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 152 Pa. 314, 25 A. 498 (1893); COOLEY, supra note 5, §
275; 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 5, § 21.4; 1 LABATT, supra note 5, §§ 259-74; PROSSER, supra
note 5, § 80.
Although Dean Prosser does not expressly define assumption of risk, he indicates that
the defense is recognized in three broad types of situations: (1) when the plaintiff in advance
has given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him; (2)
when the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant, with knowledge
that the defendant will not protect him against the risk; and (3) when the plaintiff, aware of
a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily to encounter
it. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 68.
11. See, e.g., Pollich v. Sellers, 42 La. Ann. 623, 7 So. 786 (1890); Tenanty v. Boston
Mfg. Co., 170 Mass. 323, 49 N.E. 654 (1898); Wheeler v. Berry, 95 Mich. 250, 54 N.W. 876
(1893); Marean v. New York, S. & W.R.R., 167 Pa. 220, 31 A. 562 (1895); Reese v. Wheeling
& E.G.R.R., 42 W. Va. 333, 26 S.E. 204 (1896); COOLEY, supra note 5, § 284; 1 LABATr, supra
note 5, §§ 294-313; PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80.
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection." PROSSER, supra note 5, § 65.
12. See, e.g., Quebec S.S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U.S. 375 (1890); Farwell v. Boston &
W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842); Waddell v. Simoson, 112 Pa. 567, 4 A. 725 (1886);
Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Nuckols, 91 Va. 193, 21 S.E. 342 (1895); COOLEY, supra note 5, § 277; 2
LABA'r, supra note 5, §§ 470-73; PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80.
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a consequence, if an employee commenced or continued employ-
ment in the face of known and apprehended hazards, he was denied
recovery on the ground that he had assumed the risks of injury from
such hazards and thereby had relieved his employer from any duty
to eliminate them. 3 The employee of course could refuse to work
under hazardous conditions, but the common law recognized no
right in the employee to remain at work and insist that conditions
be made safe;' 4 thus an employee's right to a safe workplace at
common law was actually nothing more than a right to refuse to
work under unsafe conditions. 5
The failure of common law rules to protect employees ade-
quately from hazardous working conditions" provided the impetus
for several federal and state statutes that promulgated safety stan-
dards for various industries. 7 Some courts held violation of these
statutory duties to be evidence or actual proof of the employer's
breach of duty. 8 More importantly, however, several courts refused
The fellow servant rule holds that an employer is not liable for injuries caused solely by
the negligence of a fellow employee. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80.
13. See 1 LABATr, supra note 5, § 274. Professor Labatt explicates the doctrine of
assumption of risk as it applies to the law of employer-employee as follows: (1) An employee
assumes "ordinary" risks-those risks that the employer cannot with the exercise of reasona-
ble care eliminate from the workplace. (2) An employee does not assume "extraordinary"
risks-those that the employer could eliminate from the workplace with the exercise of rea-
sonable care-unless such risks are known and apprehended by the employee. See id. §§ 2,
3, 274.
14. See Blumrosen, Ackerman, Kligerman, VanSchaick & Sheehy, Injunctions Against
Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Conditions, 64 CAL. L. REV. 702, 711
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen]. Apparently no prior case has directly ruled on the
question of an employee's right to compel his employer to provide safe working conditions.
The application by the courts of the common law defenses discussed previously justifies the
implication that no such right existed at common law.
15. See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 711. An employee could raise as a defense his
employer's failure to provide a safe workplace if the employer sued for breach of the employ-
ment contract.
16. See E. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 10-11 (1961); J.
PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BrrrER WAGES 47-55 (1973) (Ralph Nader's study group report on disease
and injury on the job).
17. See, e.g., Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-29, 31-34 (1970) (amended 1976);
Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 11-16 (1970) (amended 1976); Mining Regulation Act,
1897 Ala. Acts 1099 (current version at ALA. CODE tit. 26, §§ 166 (13)-166(23) (1958 & Interim
Supp. 1975)); Structural Work Act, 1907 Ill. Laws 312 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1969)); Act of March 11, 1903, 1903 Kan. Sess. Laws 540-43 (current
version at KAN. STAT. §§ 44-101 to -108 (1973)); Act of April 15, 1903, 1903 Tenn. Pub. Acts
520-46 (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 58-301 to -307 (1968)); Employee Protection
Act, 1905 Wash. Laws 164-70 (repealed 1973). These statutes were enacted primarily in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
18. See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 711 n.46. For a general discussion of violation of
statute as proof of negligence, see PROSSER, supra note 5, § 36.
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. to allow the defenses of assumption of risk 9 and contributory negli-
gence ° in employee actions based on violations of these safety stat-
utes. The effect of the abrogation of these common law defenses was
to place upon the employer an absolute duty to provide a safe work-
place to the extent provided by the statutes. The common theme of
these decisions, based on the premise that an employee should not
be forced to choose between working under unsafe conditions and
not working at all, suggests an implicit judicial recognition of an
employee's right to a safe workplace.
The passage of state employer liability acts,2 which accom-
plished legislatively what had been accomplished judicially under
the safety statutes, buttressed the right of an employee to a safe
workplace. Employer's liability acts modified or entirely abrogated
the defenses of assumption of risk,23 contributory negligence, 24 and
the fellow servant rule in actions involving injuries caused by an
employer's negligence.26 These acts also were premised on the idea
that the employee should not be forced to choose between unsafe
employment and no employment at all, and thus evidence further
19. See, e.g., Osborne v. Salvation Army, 107 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1939); Finnegan v. Royal
Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950); Waschow v. Kelly Coal Co., 245 Ill. 516, 92
N.E. 303 (1910); Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Prods. Co., 180 Minn. 21, 230 N.W. 125 (1930);
Volpe v. Hammersley Mfg. Co., 96 N.J.L. 489, 115 A. 665 (1921); Welch v. Waterbury Co.,
206 N.Y. 522, 100 N.E. 426 (1912); American Zinc Co. v. Graham, 132 Tenn. 586, 179 S.W.
138 (1915). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496(F); Prosser, Contributory Negli-
gence as Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN. L. REy. 105, 118-23 (1948).
20. See, e.g., Gowins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 299 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 824 (1962); Thomas v. Chicago Embossing Co., 307 Ill. 134, 136 N.E. 285 (1923); Caspar
v. Lewin, 82 Kan. 604, 109 P. 657, rehearing denied, 83 Kan. 799, 109 P. 669 (1910), appeal
dismissed, 223 U.S. 736 (1911); Volpe v. Hammersley Mfg. Co., 96 N.J.L. 489, 115 A. 665
(1921); Koenig v. Patrick Const. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483; Prosser, supra note 19.
21. See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 712.
22. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-801 to -808 (1971); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2800-2804 (West
1971); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1401 to -1407 (1948); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-9-1 to -3-9-11 (Bums
1974); KAN. STAT. §§ 66-234 to -241 (1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 153, §§ 1-9 (West 1958);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 219.77 to .83 (West 1947); N.Y. EMPL'RS LIAB. LAW §§ 1-18 (Consol. 1955)
(amended 1963). These statutes were enacted primarily in the early twentieth century.
23. E.g., ARIz. REy. STAT. § 23-806 (1971); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2801 (West 1971); IDAHO
CODE § 44-1401 (1948); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-9-2, -3-9-3 (Bums 1974); KAN. STAT. § 66-239
(1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 153, § 3 (West 1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 219.80 (West
1947); N.Y. EMPL'RS LIAB. LAW § 4 (Consol. 1955).
24. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 23-806 (1971); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2801 (West 1971); IDAHO
CODE § 44-1401 (1948); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-9-2 (Burns 1974); KAN. STAT. § 66-238 (1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 219.79 (West 1947).
25. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2801 (West 1971); IDAHO CODE § 44-1403 (1948); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 153, § 1 (West 1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 219.77 (WEST 1947).
26. See generally CHEIT, supra note 16, at 11; PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 16, at 54.
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implicit recognition of an employee's right to safe working condi-
tions.
The modern trend of recognizing an employee's right to a safe
workplace culminated with the enactment of the federal Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 19707 (OSHA) and the passage of
several state occupational safety and health acts shortly there-
after.2 1 Section 5(a) of OSHA requires that each employer furnish
his employees with "employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." 9 The duty
OSHA imposes on employers is in some respects stricter and in some
respects less stringent than the employer's common law duty to
exercise ordinary care to provide a reasonably safe workplace." Al-
though OSHA does not grant employees a private right of action to
enforce the statute,3' the act establishes an extensive administrative
enforcement apparatus that permits employee involvement in en-
forcement procedures.32 Employees, for example, may complain of
violations of the statute, 3 request inspections to determine if an
27. Occupational Safety & Health Act §§ 2-33, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as OSHA].
28. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 23-401 to -430 (Supp. 1976); CAL. LAB.CODE §§ 6300-6708
(West Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-367 to -385 (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, §§ 137.1 to .23 (Smith-Hurd 1976); INn. CODE ANN. §§ 22-8-1.1-1 to -8-1.1-50
(Burns 1974 & Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 182.50 to .674 (West Supp. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 50-501 to -579 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.17.010 to .17.910
(Supp. 1976).
29. OSHA § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970). This section also requires each employer
to comply with all safety standards promulgated under OSHA. Id.
30. See Miller, supra note 7, at 616-17. The general duty clause (§ 5(a)(1)) seems to
impose an absolute duty on the employer to eliminate recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious injury. In the absence of a specific standard, the
employer is under no obligation to eliminate unrecognized hazards irrespective of the degree
of risk they create. Nor is the employer obligated to eliminate recognized hazards if they are
likely to cause only serious mental or emotional, rather than physical, harm; if they are less
than "likely" to cause serious physical harm; or if they are likely to cause only nonserious
harm. Id. at 617.
31. See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 707-08. Several courts of appeal have held that
no private right of action will be implied from the provisions of OSHA. See Byrd v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974);
Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 483 F.2d 67
(5th Cir. 1973).
32. The administration of OSHA is entrusted to the Secretary of Labor. Federal admin-
istrators have power to cite, conciliate, assess penalties, and ultimately to obtain court assis-
tance in enforcing the provisions of the act. See OSHA §§ 6-9, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655-658 (1970).
OSHA administrators also may develop safety standards, promulgate these standards
through rules, regulations, and guidelines, and process complaints and ensure compliance by
initiating verification systems. See OSHA §§ 6, 8, 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 657, 669 (1970).
33. Id. § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1970).
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employer is complying with the provisions of the act,34 and compel
the administrative enforcement agency to seek injunctive relief if a
hazard in the workplace creates an "imminent" danger of serious
injury2'3 Most state occupational safety and health statutes provide
for similar enforcement mechanisms and contain similar provisions
regarding employee involvement.3 6 These statutes expressly recog-
nize an employee's right to a safe workplace, but they do not grant
employees a direct judicial remedy to enforce that right.
The legislative and judicial developments outlined above grew
out of the failure of common law rules regarding employer liability
to protect adequately the safety of employees. Taken together, these
developments indicate that the law now recognizes that an em-
ployee has a legally protectable interest in a safe workplace. The
instant decision presents the important question of what common
law duties should be imposed and what remedies should be avail-
able for breach of those duties in light of recent statutory develop-
ments.
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
The court initially stated that the common law of New Jersey
guarantees to employees the right to work in a safe environment and
places upon employers an affirmative duty to provide a work area
that is free from unsafe conditions .3 After noting that OSHA in no
way pre-empted the field of occupational safety, 38 the court stated
that when an employer is under a common law duty to act, a court
of equity may enforce an employee's rights by granting injunctive
relief.39 Citing three New Jersey cases dealing with employee collec-
tive bargaining rights,4" the court reasoned that equitable relief is
34. Id.
35. Id. § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1970).
36. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 23-419 (Supp. 1976) (employee may seek writ of manda-
mus to compel commissioner to abate an imminent danger); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
374(f)(1) (West Supp. 1976) (employee may request inspections); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §
137.17 (Smith-Hurd 1976) (employee may complain of violations).
37. 368 A.2d at 410. The court based this statement on several previous New Jersey
cases that restated the common law rule that an employer was obligated to use reasonable
care to provide a safe workplace. See Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America, 11 N.J. Super.
445, 78 A.2d 411 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 7 N.J. 77, 80 A.2d 494 (1951); Davis v.
New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 N.J.L. 103, 182 A. 850 (1936); Clayton v. Ainsworth, 122 N.J.L.
160, 4 A.2d 274 (1939); Burns v. Delaware & Atl. Tel. & Tel. Co., 70 N.J.L. 745, 59 A. 220
(1904); McDonald v. Standard Oil Co., 69 N.J.L. 445, 55 A. 289 (1903).
38. 368 A.2d at 410-11.
39. Id. at 411.
40. Johnson v. Christ Hospital, 84 N.J. Super. 541, 202 A.2d 874 (Ch. 1964), af/'d, 45
N.J. 108, 211 A.2d 376 (1965); Cooper v. Nutley Son Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639
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available in labor matters unless such relief is prohibited by stat-
ute."' The court also noted that the New Jersey workman's compen-
sation act did not affect its power to grant injunctive relief since
that act provides the exclusive remedy for the employee only when
the hazard has ripened into an injury, and a suit for damages has
been instituted.42
The court then considered whether the presence of tobacco
smoke rendered plaintiff's workplace unsafe. After reviewing exten-
sive medical and scientific evidence,4" the court concluded that the
passive inhalation of tobacco smoke and its gaseous by-products is
deleterious to the health of a significant portion of the population44
and that the danger therefore was reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant. Noting that tobacco smoke is not a necessary by-product
of defendant's business operations, the court reasoned that plaintiff
could not be deemed to have assumed the risk of that hazard as one
incident to employment. 5 The court therefore concluded that in
failing to prohibit smoking in the working area, defendant had
breached its duty to provide plaintiff with a safe workplace. Ac-
cordingly, the court ordered defendant to prohibit smoking in the
work area."
IV. COMMENT
The instant opinion is the first express judicial recognition of
an employee's common law right to compel his employer to elimi-
nate unsafe conditions from the workplace. The decision illustrates
a trial court's attempt to reconcile old principles of law with new
social values, and the court's refusal to remain safely within the
bounds of judicial precedent evidences the ability for growth and
adaptation that lies at the heart of the common law process.48 Fur-
thermore, the decision is in accord with the generally accepted con-
(1961); Independent Dairy Workers v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85, 127 A.2d 869 (1956).
41. 368 A.2d at 412.
42. Id.
43. The court used the 1975 Surgeon General's report dealing with the health conse-
quences of smoking, published medical papers, and several affidavits of physicians and scien-
tists. See id. at 414-15.
44. Id. at 415.
45. Cf. Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America, 11 N.J. Super. 445, 78 A.2d 411 (Super.
Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 7 N.J. 77, 80 A.2d 494 (1951) (employee held to have assumed
the risk of a disease as one incident to employment).
46. 368 A.2d at 415-16.
47. Id. at 416.
48. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1908); Stone, The
Common Lau in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 12-14 (1936).
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cept that tort law should embody and reflect basic social values,
which also may find expression in new statutory policies.49
Regrettably, however, the court fails to provide adequate guide-
lines for determining when an employer may be compelled to elimi-
nate an unsafe condition in the workplace. The analysis required to
ascertain whether injunctive relief is appropriate necessarily in-
volves a determination of what duty an employer owes to his em-
ployees with respect to safe working conditions. Although the court
does not expressly reject the traditional common law standard," the
opinion states that an employer may be compelled to eliminate all
"preventable" hazards.5' By distinguishing a previous case that in-
volved an occupational disease, 52 the court may be equating
"preventable" hazards with those that are not "necessary by-
products" of the employer's business operation. This equation, how-
ever, leaves unanswered the question whether the term "necessary
by-products" encompasses only hazardous conditions that are tech-
nically infeasible to eliminate or also includes hazardous conditions
that are correctable but only at great economic expense. 3 The court
perhaps considered it unnecessary to explicate fully the parameters
of the employer's duty, since the instant case involved an activity
that was not related directly to the employer's business operations
and required no great expenditure to eliminate. The lack of a clear
delineation of what duty an employer owes, however, renders the
opinion of questionable usefulness in cases that involve more diffi-
cult factual situations.
The court also fails to analyze whether injunctive relief is ap-
propriate in all cases in which an employer has breached his duty
to provide a safe workplace. Normally, injunctive relief is available
only when all remedies at law are inadequate either because the
impending harm is not compensable in monetary damages or be-
cause the harm is a continuing one that would necessitate a multi-
plicity of legal actions. Although the plaintiff in the instant case
49. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 33; Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEx.
L. REv. 1, 257 (1959). See also Buhler v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. La.
1974) (holding that OSHA standards and the fact that those standards had been violated may
be used as evidence of negligence).
50. See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
51. 368 A.2d at 411.
52. Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America, 11 N.J. Super. 445, 78 A.2d 411 (Super. Ct.
App. Div.), cert. denied, 7 N.J. 77, 80 A.2d 494 (1951).
53. For a discussion of the same problem in the context of OSHA's general duty clause,
see Miller, supra note 7, at 615-27.
54. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5 (1973).
[Vol. 30:10591082
RECENT CASES
easily could have satisfied either of these conditions, the failure of
the court to impose the traditional equity requirements, coupled
with the court's broad statement as to its equity powers, may imply
that injunctive relief is always available when an employer breaches
his duty to provide a safe workplace. The propriety of such expan-
sive injunctive relief, however, may be seriously questioned in states
that have enacted occupational safety and health acts patterned
after OSHA. 5 The traditional requirement that all remedies at law
be inadequate before equitable relief is available embraces adminis-
trative avenues of relief as well as judicial relief,56 and all of the state
occupational safety and health acts provide extensive administra-
tive remedies for occupational hazards.57 Courts in those states
therefore may require those remedies to be exhausted, or at least
shown to be ineffective or inapplicable,5" before they make injunc-
tive relief available.
Although analytically incomplete in several respects, the opin-
ion of the instant court appears to reach the correct result. The
common law purported to impose upon employers a duty to provide
a safe workplace for their employees, but it provided no adequate
remedy to compel compliance with that duty. The instant decision
corrects this anomaly in the law and may well promote an invigorat-
ing reconsideration of the role of the common law in the field of
occupational health and safety.
G. DAVID DODD
55. See notes 28-37 supra and accompanying text.
56. See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 715.
57. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
58. See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 715.
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